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Summary
Many believe  that the Department of Defense (DoD) — including the Air Force —
must transform itself to ensure future U.S. military dominance. The Air Force has a
transformation plan that includes advanced technologies, concept development, and
organizational innovation. Issues for Congress include the efficacy of this plan, its
feasibility, and the attendant costs. This report will be updated as events dictate.
Introduction
Over the past several years, defense analysts and decision makers have increasingly
discussed the need for the Department of Defense (DoD) to transform itself in light of
rapidly changing geo-military circumstances.1  DoD and the military services have
developed transformation plans and, to varying degrees, embarked upon them.2 Yet,
questions remain about cost, schedule, and the need to balance transformation objectives
with near term modernization needs.
Definition and Impetus.  One obstacle to transformation is that there is no single,
approved, definition. However, a 1999 Defense Science Board study on warfighting
transformation generated a useful working definition: 
Transformation is a process that seeks fundamental change in how an enterprise
conducts its business....the intent of this transformation is to foster discontinuous
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change in the nation’s capabilities to conduct (military) operations – one or more
revolutions in military affairs (RMAs).3
Transformation will require not just new technologies, but also new operational concepts
and organizational innovation. Transformation is not modernization, which aims primarily
at improving existing capabilities. Transformation and modernization efforts may often be
contradictory, especially when they compete with each other for funding and priority.
Although they disagree on some details, senior leaders in both the Clinton and Bush
administrations describe the need for the United States to embark on a transformation path
today, to meet a range of security challenges from 2010 to 2020.4  Many defense thinkers
agree, saying that while the world has changed greatly over the past 15 years, the Services
have not. Generally, today’s  military looks too much like that of the Cold War, they say.
While the United States is today’s dominant military power, past dominant powers have
been surprised by changing circumstances and unforeseen threats.5
Transformation Process(es) and Desired Output.  In May 1996 the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff published Joint Vision 2010 (JV2010):  a conceptual
template for how America’s armed forces may leverage technological opportunities to
achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint military operations. This transformation guide
was updated, expanded and published in May 2000 as JV2020.6 
While exact transformation processes are still being developed, it is generally believed
that implementing transformation will require greater emphasis on 1) service and joint
concept development and experiments, 2) science and technology efforts, tied closely to
warfighters, 3) processes that identify and quickly operationalize promising concepts, and
4) interoperability efforts critical for effective coalition operations.7 
It is hoped that these transformation processes will generate a new military that can
dominate a broad spectrum of potential threats. A transformed Air Force, for example,
may be able to execute global attacks from the United States that would be effective (e.g.
high probability of kill, low cost per kill and no collateral damage) against fixed, buried,
and time-critical targets that are intermingled with civilians
Air Force Transformation Activities
Efforts to Date.  Air Force leaders believe that the Air Force  has already achieved
a military transformation, and that their current activities are a continuation of this
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process.8  Air Force officials contend that in the 1991 war with Iraq (Operation Desert
Storm) the Air Force demonstrated two of the three required elements of a military
transformation: The use of new technologies (stealth and precision guided munitions) to
enable novel operational concepts (effects-based planning, and parallel warfare)  and “leap-
ahead” capabilities (the total destruction of Iraq’s air power capabilities). 
Following Operation Desert Storm, the Air Force launched organizational changes
(the melding of the Strategic and Tactical Air Commands, and the introduction of the
Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF)), that represented the final piece of this first phase
of Air Force transformation. Whether the Air Force view on its state of transformation is
accurate or not, it appears that the Air Force has taken steps aimed at transformation, and
has established processes designed to guide these efforts. Initiatives appear to address
most if not all facets of the air power enterprise. The Air Force has borrowed a concept
from the Army –called DOTMLPF – that reflects its desire to improve doctrine,
organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities in a coordinated
manner. 
The Air Force’s transformation process is encapsulated in a vision – Global
Vigilance, Power and Reach – that describes transformation goals and methods. Six
functional Battle Labs were established to develop new ideas and concepts to refine this
vision. The Air Force also annually conducts wargames and experiments such as the
Expeditionary Force Experiments. An Innovation Steering Group was established to guide
transformation activities, and ensure “warfighter” inputs and feedback into the process.
Changes have also been made to weapon acquisition and budget development and
allocation processes. For example, the Air Force Resource Allocation Process – initiated
in October 2000 -- is designed to give  the Major Commands (e.g. Air Combat Command,
Space Command, and Air Mobility Command) a greater voice in the budgeting process.
Continuing Activities. While Air Force officials express satisfaction with their
achievements to date, they say that Air Force transformation is not complete, and that they
are continuing the transformation process by pursuing advanced technology, new
operational concepts, and organizational innovation.
The Air Force is pursuing technologies that it believes could enable it to develop new
operational concepts, and dominate air, space, and cyberspace. These include high
performance stealthy aircraft (such as the F-22 and Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)), unmanned
combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs), directed energy weapons (such as the airborne laser),
miniaturized munitions, and advanced command, control, communications, computers and
intelligence (C4I). The Air Force’s space-related programs are in varying states of
maturity, and include space-based radars, space-based lasers, micro satellites, “next
generation” missile defense, and space operations vehicles. Air Force efforts in the area
of cyberspace include computer network attack, computer network defense, and
information assurance activities. Both space and cyberspace capabilities are expected to
become increasingly important as the Air Force and the other services leverage U.S.
information technology assets in numerous warfighting applications. 
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The impact of new technologies is limited if they do not create, or are not embodied,
in new warfighting approaches. The Air Force appears to be developing new operational
concepts designed to exploit emerging technologies and enable new capabilities.  These
operational concepts are in varying stages of maturity and they often overlap. They range
from very narrowly focused ideas to broad philosophies. They include: 
• Effects-based Operations (EBO) is a framework for planning, executing, and
assessing military operations. Its goal is to achieve desired effects through the
tailored application of joint combat power. EBO may depend heavily on new
capabilities such as “predictive battlespace awareness.” 
• Global Reconnaissance Strike/Global Strike Task Force (GSTF) is an initial
power projection employment concept, designed to defeat adversary anti-access
threats (weapons like surface-to-air, cruise, and ballistic missiles, that make it difficult
to operate in a foreign theater). It would consist of a “kick down the door” force (B-
2s, F-22s and other assets) that would make room for “persistence forces” like the
JSF. A GSTF could employ Effects-based Operations. 
• Rapid Halt Operations would capitalize on precision, reach, advanced C4I and
reconnaissance to rapidly employ tailored joint forces to control adversary actions
and seize the initiative by isolating, incapacitating, and rapidly halting aggression.
The final facet of the Air Force’s transformation effort is organizational innovation.
Organizational changes can be the most difficult and most important piece of the
transformation puzzle. Organizational change is difficult because it involves human factors;
non-quantifiable, social and psychological issues, such as tradition, culture, and mind set.
However, organizational change is central to transformation, because it codifies and
institutionalizes new capabilities and ways of doing business.
Refining the EAF appears to be the Air Force’s main effort in the area of
organizational change. The purpose of the  EAF is to provide a structure and schedule to
effectively meet contingency demands. The EAF will organize much of the Air Force into
10 Aerospace Expeditionary Forces (AEFs) that will include combat, mobility, and combat
support forces that rotate on a 15-month training and deployment cycle. Each AEF
includes approximately 175 aircraft and 20,000 people from both the active and reserve
components. AEFs (and two rapid-reaction Aerospace Expeditionary Wings) form the
heart of the EAF, but strategic mobility forces and so-called low density/high demand
(LD/HD) forces (such as U-2s and JSTARS) are also key elements. The Air Force hopes
to deploy an AEF in 48 hours, and up to five AEFs within 15 days. Each AEF is  tailored
to the regional commander’s needs.
The Air Force completed its first full 15-month AEF rotation and began its second
on December 1, 2000. The Air Force learned some lessons from this first cycle, and has
made refinements to the concept. For example, it has created additional LD/HD crews and
linked them to the AEFs. Although this does not reduce the burden high deployment rates
place on aircraft, it does help reduce the stress on people.
 
Issues for Congress
Congress may, as part of its defense oversight function, assess the merits of the Air
Force’s transformation program: Is it aggressive enough? Is it politically or economically
feasible? Will it achieve the desired effect? Are transformation goals balanced with
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important modernization needs? The debate over the F-22 and JSF programs may offer an
example of how transformation questions intersect, and may increasingly vie for
Congressional attention. Evident in this debate are contrasting views on which
technologies to pursue,  how aggressively to pursue them, and the difference between
transformation and modernization.
Critics of USAF plans to acquire 339 F-22s and 1,763 JSFs argue that these aircraft
are modernization, or recapitalization programs, and that the Air Force’s requirement for
new fighters would be adequately satisfied in the near term by upgrading and procuring
F-15s and F-16s. They argue that  the effectiveness of today’s fighter and attack aircraft
can be maintained through upgrades to their radars, command and control systems, and
weapons. Future adversaries, they argue, will increasingly employ  mobile cruise, ballistic
and surface-to-air missiles that will jeopardize the forward operating bases that shorter
range military aircraft – such as the F-22 and JSF – will require to generate significant
sortie rates. By cancelling or truncating the F-22 and JSF, critics argue, the Air Force can
free up substantial funding that can be used to more aggressively pursue programs such
as space-based assets, directed energy weapons, information operations, UCAVs, or long
range bombers. Such programs are more likely to overcome tomorrow’s anti-access
threats, and offer more transformation potential.  
Supporters of the Air Force’s transformation plan counter that while the F-22 and
JSF do modernize today’s fighter and attack aircraft force, they will also transform air
operations. Their combination of stealth and high aeronautical performance (e.g.
maneuverability, speed, and endurance), will enable radical capabilities and operational
concepts. Further, they argue, along with long-range bombers, stealthy high-performance
aircraft offer the best potential for overcoming tomorrow’s anti-access threats. Air Force
supporters also contend that F-15s and F-16s are nearing the end of their useful lifetimes.
Spending today’s money  perpetuating 1970s-era technology, they argue, is not wise.
Finally, supporters note that the Air Force is already pursuing space-based assets,
cyberspace operations, directed energy weapons, and UCAVs. The Air Force’s current
budget makes it difficult to spend more on these programs, given other pressing priorities.
An issue implicit in the debate described above, is the pace and aggressiveness with
which the Air Force should pursue potentially high-payoff technologies such as space-
based assets and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs and UCAVS). Many analysts argue that
exporting many Air Force operations from the atmosphere to outer space could increase
their effectiveness and survivability, and should therefore be pursued aggressively; perhaps
at the expense of other programs. Others, including many in Congress, strongly support
an  increased use of UAVs and UCAVs to engender new warfighting capabilities, and to
reduce the risk of U.S. casualties. In addition to setting aggressive goals for fielding
UAVs, congressional UAV advocates also find fault with the recent decision not to
accelerate procurement of the Global Hawk UAV, the Air Force’s next generation
airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platform.9 This perspective
argues that the Air Force is prone to sacrificing transformation opportunities for
modernization needs, and that a balance between modernization and transformation
requirements must be found.
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Air Force officials argue that they are pursuing transformation programs – such as
space and UAVs – as aggressively as is prudent within projected budgets. Current
readiness shortfalls make Air Force modernization a tangible and high priority, that should
not be sacrificed for transformation programs that may or may, not pay off years hence.
If the Air Force is asked to more aggressively lead DoD’s efforts in these transformation
areas, they argue, this effort should be funded in addition to modernization. Perhaps a re-
examination of the traditional division of DoD’s budget among the Services is appropriate,
they argue.
Air Force organizational activities are also an issue. The Air Force believes that
refining and implementing the EAF will have a transformational effect. Air Force officials
say that the EAF compels the Air Force to organize and think about itself in terms of
composite teams, not along functional “stove pipes.” It also ensures that the units
deployed to conduct a mission are at the peak of their training and readiness. Furthermore,
Air Force officials believe that the EAF  creates an expeditionary mind set and provides
an effective mechanism for reducing personnel tempo, which in turn could ameliorate
recruitment and retention problems. Finally, the Air Force believes that the EAF provides
a basis for additional organizational innovation. As an example, Air Force officials cite the
GSTF, which will be composed of the first two or three AEFs deployed to a theater.
Critics suggest that while a useful force management tool, the EAF concept is not
transformational. The EAF, they argue, is a more modest organizational change (like
changes instituted by the Navy many years ago) that simply facilitates rotational forward
deployments of forces.  To transform the Air Force’s warfighting capabilities, the EAF,
or other organizations, must inherently leverage new technologies and enable new
operational concepts. These characteristics are not evident in the EAF, they argue.
A great debate also revolves around some of the Air Force’s transformation
operational concepts, such as Rapid Halt Operations. While many in the Air Force believe
that air power alone can defeat or at least stalemate enemy ground forces, many other
analysts – including many in the Army and Marine Corps – maintain that only ground
forces can capture and control enemy territory and forces. 
Many studies suggest that a final issue for Congress may be a review of its own role
in transformation. Leading transformation thinkers argue that military transformation faces
powerful status quo opposition, and will be infeasible without close congressional
coordination.  They describe a need for new working arrangements between the Services
and Congress. These studies assert that to achieve transformation, Congress should
consider  modifications to current budgetary oversight mechanisms, such as bi-annual
budget authority, giving DoD managers more flexibility to shift funds between accounts,
and removing statutory barriers to a greater private role in areas such as defense depot
maintenance. They also say that Congress must play a role in managing the defense
industrial base, in part by  devising  new rules and procedures that encourage technology
development, rather than large weapon production quantities.10
